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Abstract:  Members of linguistic communities often have opposing beliefs about the existence 
of beings denoted by lexical items or about the truth of the attributes ascribed to entities. As very 
little research has been forthcoming in this regard, this article focuses on how people's beliefs about 
existence and truth are encoded in explanatory dictionaries, and on the kind of semantics that is 
needed to account for these beliefs. The way in which dictionaries define issues of existence and 
truth against a default world view is outlined in Section 2. Section 3 indicates what happens if the 
default world view of lexicographic descriptions changes and how cultural biases operate in the 
treatment of the meaning of lexical items that denote "imaginary" beings or "imaginary" attributes. 
Section 4 summarizes the main findings of the article and delimits topics for further research. 
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Opsomming:  Oor die definiëring van "denkbeeldige" wesens en eienskap-
pe: Hoe hanteer leksikograwe kultureel bepaalde verskille in beskouings 
oor die kosmologie, ontologie en epistemologie?  Lede van taalgemeenskappe het 
dikwels opponerende beskouings oor die bestaan van wesens waarna leksikale items verwys of oor 
die waarheid van die eienskappe wat aan entiteite toegeskryf word. Omdat baie min navorsing in 
dié verband beskikbaar is, fokus hierdie artikel op hoe mense se beskouings oor die bestaan en 
waarheid ten opsigte hiervan in verklarende woordeboeke gekodeer word, en op die soort seman-
tiek wat benodig word om hierdie opvattings te verantwoord. Die manier waarop woordeboeke 
kwessies van bestaan en waarheid teen 'n verstekwêreldbeskouing omskryf, word in Afdeling 2 
geskets. Afdeling 3 dui aan wat gebeur indien die verstekwêreldbeskouing van leksikografiese 
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omskrywings verander en hoe kulturele vooroordele 'n uitwerking het op die behandeling van die 
betekenis van leksikale items wat verwys na "denkbeeldige" wesens of "denkbeeldige" eienskappe. 
Afdeling 4 som die hoofbevindinge van die artikel op en baken onderwerpe vir verdere navorsing 
af. 
Sleutelwoorde:  DENKBEELDIGE WESENS, FABELAGTIGE WESENS, DEFINIEEREIEN-
SKAPPE, LEKSIKOGRAFIESE DEFINISIES, BESTAAN, WAARHEID, BETEKENIS, VERWYSINGS, 
DENOTASIE, GEÏDEALISEERDE KOGNITIEWE MODELLE, KOGNITIEWE SEMANTIEK, KUL-
TURELE VOOROORDEEL, KULTURELE SENSITIWITEIT 
1. Introduction 
Lexicographers faced with the task of compiling a monolingual dictionary of a 
language will often find that (a) such a language contains lexical items that 
refer to entities or beings about which the linguistic community may have oppos-
ing beliefs as to whether such entities in fact exist, and/or that (b) members of a 
linguistic community have opposing beliefs as to whether the ascribed attrib-
utes of some entities are in fact true.  
Typical examples of (a) are lexical items denoting entities which belong to 
the domain of religion, the spiritual world, or the supernatural. In English, lexi-
cal items such as God, god, heaven, hell, angel, spirit, and ghost fall in this cate-
gory; and in Zulu, lexical items such as tokoloshe, mamlambo, and (i)mpundulu. In 
the Cambridge International Dictionary of English (CIDE), a class of so-called 
"imaginary creatures" is distinguished, and the class includes such beings as 
dragons, unicorns, witches, wizards, fairies, goblins and ghosts, and also the 
grim reaper. As category they are considered to be figments of human imagi-
nation, "not real", because they are created by and only exists in the mind (cf. 
CIDE, p. 704). As the list indicates, the category includes, besides entities from 
the domain of religion, also words referring to entities in Greek mythology, 
fairy tales, and other narratives.  
Cases of (b) are illustrated by beliefs such as sangomas possessing the 
power of divination, the cancer-bush having the property of healing cancer, or 
lucky charms bringing the wearers luck. In these cases, however, the existence 
of the entities is not in doubt, but members of the linguistic community may 
have opposing beliefs as to the truth of the attributes ascribed to these entities.  
The importance of these questions of existence and truth for lexicogra-
phers lies in the fact that these beliefs often constitute core beliefs and values 
for a linguistic community, and that irreverence of this fact holds the danger of 
such a dictionary being rejected by the very community for which it is meant as 
linguistic tool. For example, Christian and Moslem communities believe in the 
existence of God, and defining God as an "imaginary being" will no doubt evoke 
uproar. Likewise, some Zulu speakers believe sangomas to have the power of 
divination, and either omitting this belief in dictionary definitions or treating it 
as a possibly false or misguided belief would do injustice to the meaning these 
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speakers ascribe to the lexical item and would be found offensive or culturally 
insensitive.  
The question thus arises (a) whether beliefs about the existence of entities 
and beliefs about the truth of the attributes ascribed to some entities are en-
coded in dictionaries, (b) if so, what descriptive practices are followed in this 
regard, and (c) what kind of semantics is needed to provide an adequate ac-
count of the beliefs members of a linguistic community have about issues of 
existence and truth.  
As will be indicated below, dictionaries in fact do encode beliefs about the 
existence of entities and beliefs and about the truth of the attributes of others, 
although very little research could be found that spells out either what lexico-
graphic principles are followed in this regard or what kind of lexical semantics 
backs up lexicographic principles and descriptive practices.  
The first main goal of this article is therefore to provide such an analysis.  
In Section 2, current lexicographic views and practices in a number of 
modern dictionaries are analysed. It is indicated that ontological and episte-
mological beliefs are indeed incorporated into lexicographic definitions and 
that lexicographers have developed a number of descriptive devices to signal 
differences in the ontological and epistemological beliefs held by a linguistic 
community. It is argued, furthermore, that in the dictionaries under consider-
ation, lexicographers operate with a default world view (i.e. cosmology) in 
which the physical world is the main point of reference. All other "possible" 
worlds are taken as some form of deviance and marked as such. Issues of exis-
tence and truth are treated on the basis of possible worlds, allowing the lexico-
grapher — on the face of it — to avoid direct personal commitments as to such 
ontological and epistemological questions.  
In Section 3, it is indicated, first of all, how a change in the default world 
view (cosmology) of a dictionary or encyclopaedia changes the way lexical 
items are defined and how ontological and epistemological beliefs are inte-
grated in such a world view and in encyclopaedic entries. Defining practices in 
the Dutch medieval bestiary Der naturen bloeme ("The most beautiful from na-
ture") are analysed and used as illustration.  
Major shifts in world views often take ages, but monolingual dictionaries 
based on historical principles are often faced with the problem of having to 
reflect such changes. For example, in the Middle Ages, dragons were believed 
to exist in the physical world; now they are deemed to be imaginary creatures. 
To illustrate some of the current approaches to such historical changes in world 
views, an analysis is provided in Section 3.2 of the way the senses of the lexical 
item dragon is presented in the OED. The cultural bias that is operative in the 
treatment of dragon is also illustrated with regard to the way lexical borrowings 
can be dealt with.  
A major problem confronting lexicographers in this regard is finding a 
semantic theory which could provide a basis for analysing people's beliefs 
about existence and truth and which could be used for the description of these 
beliefs in the definitions in an explanatory dictionary.  
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In the rest of this article, cognitive semantics will be used for this purpose. 
The three main constructs which will be analysed are dictionary definitions, 
lexical meanings, various kinds of Idealized Cognitive Models and the relation-
ships between them: 
dictionary definitions — lexical meanings — Idealized Cognitive Models 
In line with cognitive semantics, it will be accepted that lexical meanings are 
mental constructs consisting of one or more beliefs (including those on exis-
tence and truth), and no strict distinction is maintained between so-called lin-
guistic and encyclopaedic beliefs. Furthermore it is accepted that the meaning 
of lexical items (or its comprising beliefs) relate to, are construed against or 
motivated by more encompassing mental constructs, often called frames, cul-
tural models or, more generally, Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs) (cf. Hol-
land and Quinn 1987, Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and Turner 1989, Palmer 1996, Shore 
1996 and Taylor 1995 for a detailed discussion). World views are taken to be 
one class of such an ICM, which functions as justificatory contexts for certain 
beliefs. For example, a number of religions define a world or cosmos, and thus 
a reality, that includes not only the physical world but also a spiritual world 
with places equivalent to the Christian heaven and hell. Holy scriptures and 
religious dogma, as well as religious metaphysics, are the sources of these reali-
ties and they dictate how the real world is to be construed and populated, and 
how these worlds, their creatures and their logics or laws within such a cosmos 
interact.  
In this regard, domains of religious experience and understanding are 
world views which are socially acquired and which explicates, according to 
Goodenough (see Keesing 1974: 77), what has to be known or believed in order 
to operate in a society. Such a world view furthermore acts as a model of what 
constitutes reality, as a model for perceiving, relating, and otherwise inter-
preting material phenomena; it provides standards for deciding what is or 
what can be, for deciding what to feel about it, what to do about it, and how to 
go about doing it. Such world views or ICMs thus permeate all our experiences 
and understanding of the realities with which we interact on a daily basis, and 
lexical items denote chunks of these experiences and understanding.  
As noted by Lyons (1977: 209-211), there are currently no strict rules or 
preferred approaches of methods as to what dictionary definitions have to 
encode about lexical meanings as mental constructs. In most cases, dictionary 
definitions are constructed with pragmatic goals in mind, such as to explain the 
meaning(s) of lexical items; consequently their success should be judged in 
terms of these pragmatic goals. The focus in this article, however, will be on 
how the defining features chosen for lexicographic definitions relate to specific 
beliefs about the existence of entities and their attributes and the larger encom-
passing ICMs against which these beliefs are motivated. 
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2. Encoding ontological and epistemological beliefs: default and devi-
ance in some modern dictionaries 
2.1 Default presuppositions and justificatory context 
Dictionary definitions by default attempt to describe and explain the mean-
ing(s) people of a linguistic community associate with a lexical item, and they 
do so by listing a number of such belief-attributes. For example, CIDE, p. 567, 
defines the primary meaning of the lexical item frog in terms of a belief about 
the category this entity belongs to and in terms of a number of beliefs about its 
morphology and habitat:  
(1) frog ANIMAL ... a small animal which has a smooth skin, lives in water 
and on land, has long powerful back legs with which it jumps, from 
place to place, has no tail, and is usually greenish-brown in colour 
The first hypothesis to be ventured is that specific ontological and epistemo-
logical presuppositions are associated by dictionary users with such lexico-
graphic descriptions of entities. The first is that the entity denoted by the lexical 
items described in fact exists, and more specifically that it exists as entity 
within the physical world as this is perceived by our senses (or extensions 
thereof such as the microscope or telescope). Lyons (1977: 209) notes in this 
regard that both reference and denotation with the help of language depend on 
and presuppose the existence of entities and their attributes to which lexical 
items refer. This view is termed the axiom of existence, i.e that whatever is 
denoted by a lexical item must exist, just as whatever is referred to by means of 
a lexical item must exist.  
Secondly, it is postulated that a lexicographic meaning description carries 
a presupposition of truth with regard to the belief attributes ascribed to this 
entity, i.e., for example, that it is true that in our physical world a frog belongs 
to a cognitively salient category (the category SMALL ANIMAL) and that it is 
true that it has the attributes listed in the definition. To put it simply: We trust 
that lexicographers will provide us with true information with regard to the 
beliefs associated with a lexical item. However, the basis for the acceptance of 
such claims about existence and truth is its verifiability in terms of our sensory 
experiences of the empirical, physical or natural world, or, as additional justifi-
cation, the theories and findings of the natural sciences.  
The reality against which both the issue of the existence of a frog and the 
issue of the truth of its attributes are defined, is thus a reality as defined by 
what we consider to be the empirical, physical or natural world. Lakoff (1987: 
158) uses the term basic realism or experiential realism to denote this world view 
and describes it as, amongst others,  
— a commitment to the existence of a real world, both external to human 
beings and including the reality of human experience, 
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— a link of some sort between human conceptual systems (the belief system 
alluded to above — PHS) and other aspects of reality, 
— a conception of truth that is not merely based on internal coherence (of 
some formal system — PHS), and 
— a commitment to the existence of stable knowledge of the external world. 
By default, lexicographic definitions thus have a logical structure of the fol-
lowing form: 
 [Ontological Marker [[Truth Marker] Attribute 1, ..., Attribute n]] 
 where 
 the ontological marker (OM) in this case refers to the external physical or 
empirical world as perceived by the language user, although not explicitly 
marked or indicated in the definition itself, 
 [A1, ..., An] refers to whatever attributes are presented to describe or ex-
plain the conceptualization of the entity to which the lexical item being 
defined, refers, and 
 the truth marker (TM), which, although not lexically encoded in the de-
fault contexts, reflects the presupposition that the listed attributes are 
true as commonly believed by members of a linguistic community.  
As indicated, [A1, ..., An] falls within the scope of the OM and the TM. In gen-
eral, existence and truth in lexicographic definitions are thus defined relative to 
some domain of human experience and understanding (and thus meaning). In 
philosophical terms, the OM may also be interpreted as an indicator of a "pos-
sible world", thus indicating that questions of existence and truth are defined, 
in this default and unmarked case, as the physical world. 
2.2 Deviance and its encoding 
2.2.1 Encoding existence relative to some domain of experience and under-
standing 
Deviance from this default world view and empirical reality as justificatory 
context is signalled in modern dictionaries by means of a wide range of explic-
itly encoded ontological and epistemological markers. These are labels and 
phrases which are presented as parts of definitions and which relativize the 
question of the existence of entities and the truth of attributes of entities to 
some possible world or domain of experience and understanding (and thus of 
meaning) that acts as reference point for issues of existence and truth. In the 
following examples, these ontological markers are in bold italics. The examples 
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are meant to be illustrative and are by no means exhaustive of all possible ways 
in which the world of reference can be marked.  
(2) dragon ... a large fierce imaginary animal, usually presented with wings, 
a long tail and fire coming out of its mouth (CIDE, p. 418) 
(3) God ... (without article) (in Christianity and other monotheistic relig-
ions) the creator and ruler of the universe and source of all moral au-
thority; the supreme being (NODE, p. 785) 
(4) heaven ... the place where God or the gods are supposed to live; place of 
complete happiness where the souls of good people go after death 
(LDOCE, p. 524) 
(5) hell ... in some religions, the place where some people are believed to go 
after death to be punished forever for the bad things they have done 
during their lives (CIDE, p. 661) 
(6) fairy ... a mythical being of folklore and romance usu. having diminu-
tive human form and magic powers and dwelling on earth in close rela-
tionship with man (Webster's Third, p. 816) 
All of these definitions can be related to the propositional structure (1), where 
the bold italicized phrases act as ontological markers, indicating the point of 
reference in terms of which the existence of the entity referred to should be 
interpreted and the truth of the attributes assigned to them. For example, (6) 
can be interpreted as: "in the world/domain of myths, folklore and romance, 
fairies usually have diminutive human form, they have magical powers, and 
they dwell on earth in close relationship with man". The ontological markers in 
these examples refer to a wide range of human domains of experience and 
understanding, but they are explicitly marked to indicate that the default justi-
ficatory context is not the physical world, but specific domains of human ex-
perience and understanding.  
As indicated by Tolkien (n.d), one could use the construct Faërie as OM in 
example (6), where Faërie then refers to the whole world created in fairy tales, 
which is one not only populated by fairies, but also by all kinds of creatures 
and places, activities, processes, etc., and where the laws of the physical world 
do not apply in toto. Likewise, religions constitute such a world and encode or 
present a view of the cosmos where not only the physical world exists, but also 
places such as a heaven and a hell which are populated by various spirits/spir-
itual beings. As narrative sources such as the Bible, Christian dogma and meta-
physics tell us, these exist in reality and have certain properties. In dictionary 
definitions, an OM such as Faërie/in fairy tales or in some religions thus act, albeit 
often metonymical, to signal such real worlds or realities. 
Although semanticists such as Lakoff (cf. Lakoff 1987) and philosophers 
such as Niiniluoto (cf. Niiniluoto 1999: 23-25) indicate that these domains of 
experience have as their source the human imagination, for some people they 
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are part and parcel of the reality that exists external to them, and they are made 
real by various means: by way of symbolization in images and representations 
which can be empirically cognized and understood, and by the fact that people 
act on these domains of experience once they have been created, as in religious 
rituals where spiritual beings are seen as living and acting and to which people 
pray and bring offerings. Sightings of such beings, or experiences of their pres-
ence or attributes are in fact often provided as further (empirical) justification 
for their existence and for the truthfulness of their attributes (cf. Palmer 1996 
and Shore 1996). 
Such a view of religion differs markedly from the views on religion and 
reality in some philosophical schools of thought. According to Niiniluoto (1999), 
for example, religious beliefs belong to Popper's World 3 of socially and cultur-
ally constructed entities. They are seen simply as products of the human imagi-
nation, and as such cannot be used as justificatory contexts, given empirical 
verifiability as criterium for both existence and truth. As Niiniluoto (1999: 233, 
fn. 6) notes: 
Gods do not exist, but were created by men as idealized pictures of themselves. 
Therefore — excluding descriptive statements about the history, psychology, and 
sociology of religion — genuine religious judgements about gods and their at-
tributes are not true. 
Niiniluoto (1999) argues, however, that for most people their reality is made up 
of various such domains of experience and understanding, and they may ac-
cept and invoke different logics and different justificatory and explanatory 
contexts for questions as to what exists and what is true, for example, common 
sense understanding and the natural sciences when it comes to the physical 
world, but the Bible, religious dogma and metaphysics when it comes to the 
domain of religion. Such "folk" models of reality therefore of necessity often 
contain conflicting beliefs (for example Darwinian beliefs about evolution ver-
sus creation according to Genesis), but it is an incoherence people accept and 
live by.  
On the face of it, relativization of the questions of existence and truth to 
some domain of experience and understanding thus opens up the possibility 
for the lexicographer to "objectively" describe such ontological and epistemo-
logical commitments/beliefs of members of a language community. However, 
given that the empirical world is used as default justificatory and explanatory 
context of necessity, also encodes a commitment to and prioritization of the 
physical/empirical world, and thus to a specific world view which is vehe-
mently opposed by anti-realists, anti-objectivists and subjectivists (cf. Niini-
luoto 1999). The latter hold (with various nuances of belief) that there is noth-
ing outside of human experience and understanding, i.e. epistemology is prior-
itized above and precedes ontology, and what is experienced as real, existing 
and true, first and foremost has its origin in the human mind. 
With regard to the issue of existence, there are, however, also some cases 
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which are not so clear-cut and different ontological markers could then be used 
to signal different contexts of justification. In the following example, the onto-
logical marker mythical or actual is used to signal that the mamlambo may in 
fact be some mythical creature (and exists in some mythical domain of experi-
ence) or the lexical item may be used to denote an entity that in fact exists in 
the physical world: 
(7) mamlambo ... A river snake mythical or actual, about which there are 
varied beliefs (DSAE, p. 211) 
2.2.2 Encoding the relative truth of attributes 
A second set of relevant examples are definitions of entities which are accepted 
or believed to exist in the real word, but of which there may be differences of 
opinion as to the truth of the attributes assigned to them. In these definitions, 
the ontological context is the physical world and the entities are accepted to 
exist in this world, but truth markers (TMs) are used as part of definitions to 
indicate that the issue of truth must be relativized to some point of reference. 
Compare the following examples: 
(8) lucky charm she always wears a lucky charm (= one that she thinks will 
cause good things to happen by chance) (CIDE, p. 846) 
(9) sangoma ... An African witchdoctor …, usu. a woman often claiming 
supernatural powers of divination (DSAE, p. 306) 
(10) (i)mpundulu (bird) ... The lightning bird ... An evil spirit about which 
there are various beliefs … It is invoked by witches, and freq. cited be-
fore judges as the instigator or cause of crime ... (DSAE, p. 231) 
Again, the issue of truth is relativized to some reference point and truth mark-
ers are used to indicate which of the beliefs about the attributes of real entities 
should be read against or are justified in terms of the physical world (the de-
fault justificatory context) and which against some other point of reference (the 
deviant justificatory context). For example, definition (9) makes the statement 
that a sangoma is usually a woman, but the truth of the attribute of having 
supernatural powers of divination is relativized to the beliefs and experiences 
of the sangomas themselves.  
One truth marker that is often used, is believed to (be/have). Although the 
point of reference it denotes is rather vague, it does signal that the truth of 
what follows in the definition should be relativized to some non-empirical 
context. This follows mainly because such a truth marker is not used when the 
justificatory context is the physical world. This becomes evident from the odd-
ity caused by inserting such truth markers in definitions that list attributes 
which are all accepted as being empirically true (by default). See the following 
definitions: 
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(11) frog a small animal [believed to have] a smooth skin, lives in water and 
on land, has long powerful back legs with which it jumps, from place to 
place, has no tail, and is usually greenish-brown in colour 
(12) frog ANIMAL ... a small animal which has a smooth skin, lives in water 
and on land, [and is believed to have] long powerful back legs with 
which it jumps, from place to place, has no tail, and is greenish-brown in 
colour 
Just as uncertainties may exist with regard to the issue of existence, lexicogra-
phers may also be in doubt as to the truth of some beliefs about the attributes 
of entities, especially when some form of empirical justification could be 
brought forward to support these beliefs. In the following example, this is indi-
cated by the truth marker has, or is believed to have:  
(13) witch ... a woman who has, or is believed to have, magic powers, esp. 
who can cast spells on people (LDOCE, p. 1264) 
3. Changing the default world view and its lexicographic implications 
World views and folk theories can and do change, as is evidenced by the dif-
ferences in the dominant world views of the Middle Ages, the period of 
enlightenment during the Renaissance, and that of "modern man" in the 21st 
century. Over such extended periods, world views may change dramatically or 
gradually with regard to their conceptual content. Some beliefs may persist, 
others may undergo only slight modification. In this section, two sets of data 
will be considered to have a closer look at how such changing world views 
effect the design of definitions and the way in which issues of existence and 
truth are handled in such definitions. The first set of data is taken from the 
medieval bestiaries, and more specifically the Dutch bestiary Der naturen bloeme 
of Jacob van Maerlant. The second set of data is taken from modern dictionar-
ies based on historical principles of which it could be accepted that they should 
link various periods and changing world views in the entries.  
3.1 Der naturen bloeme: a culturally-determined "insider's" perspective 
Jacob van Maerlant completed Der naturen bloeme (DNB) round about 1270. It is 
a Dutch translation and reworking of Thomas of Cantimpré's encyclopaedia 
Liber de natura rerum, which itself is a prime example of how knowledge and 
beliefs about nature were compiled in the Middle Ages from diverse sources — 
in fact, from almost everything that existed and could be attributed to respected 
authors, past and present. Most of this was done with an explicit didactic aim 
in mind, viz. to explicate nature for what it could teach us about God and His 
plan with/for mankind (cf. Nischik 1986: 28-36).  
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True to the scholastic tradition, very little was made of empirical verifica-
tion when it came to issues of existence and truth — these were determined by 
the existing authoritarian resources/narratives. The result is a portrayal of a 
world with a clear demarcation of the physical and the spiritual (cf. Lakoff and 
Turner 1989 for a discussion of the Great Chain of Being underlying the West-
ern Christian world view). However, this physical world was believed to be 
populated with a host of Plinian monster races, a host of creatures from Greek 
mythology, and a variety of other fabulous creatures, often accredited with 
equally fabulous or supernatural attributes (cf. Cohen 1992, Clair 1967 and 
Friedman 1981). As is exemplified in the cases discussed in Section 2, some of 
these fabulous attributes were also credited to creatures which in fact exist in 
the external world, for example the notions that the bear licks its offspring to 
life after birth and that the pelican feeds its offspring with its own blood. 
Despite the curious mixture of fable and fact in the medieval bestiaries, the 
descriptions of what is now considered to be mythical animals was given with 
the belief that these animals in fact existed in the natural world; consequently, 
they were described in DNB within a conceptual framework that can be dis-
cerned for the category (EXISTING) ANIMAL underlying all the encyclopaedic 
entries in DNB (cf. Swanepoel 2004): 
 CONCEPTUAL FRAME FOR THE CATEGORY ANIMAL 
1. Name (Latin, Dutch equivalents and etymology) 
2. Morphological features (esp. outstanding, strange or deviant physical features) 
3. Habitat (often linked to the mappa mundi) 
4. Behaviour and personality features 
5. Food/eating habits 
6. Procreation 
7. Natural enemies/Danger posed to man 
8. Instrumental use for humans 
As source of food 
Preparation of dishes 
As source for medicinal use (linked to the doctrine of the tempers)  
How to hunt down the animal 
Body parts to be used and preparation of medicinal products 
As source for other uses (e.g. clothing) 
9. Symbolic-moral values 
10. Supplementary information 
Sources of information 
Reflections on factuality/truth of information 
11. Illustrations 
Table 1: A conceptual framework for describing animals in Der naturen bloeme  
In DBN's description of the dragon, for example, Van Maerlant (cf. Van Maer-
lant 1989) lists its morphological features, its habitat, the danger it poses to 
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man, the elephant as its natural enemy, the medicinal properties of the magic 
stone it carries in its forehead, ways to catch the dragon, the potions which can 
be made from the magic stone, and his sources of information. 
With regard to the description of animals, Van Maerlant therefore makes 
no explicit distinction between so-called existing and non-existing animals in 
DNB, and all of them are viewed, understood and described as a single cate-
gory, given the belief that all of these animals, including the dragon, inhabited 
the external world. As such, these encyclopaedic entries present an "insider's" 
view of what constitutes reality within a specific culture, as backed up by a 
justificatory context of what the Bible and respected authors have to say about 
the world, its structure and inhabitants.  
3.2 Dictionaries based on historical principles: an "outsider's" view  
Dictionaries which base the organization of their definitions on historical prin-
ciples, such as OED, WNT and Webster's Third, typically organise the defini-
tions as these are evidenced from earliest to most recent usages of a lexical 
item. What is of interest in this regard, therefore, is the way in which lexical 
items referring to what is now considered to be imaginary beings, such as the 
dragon, are defined in these dictionaries. More specifically, the question is how 
lexicographers treat the changing world views or beliefs about the existence of 
these animals over the span of a specific period.  
In analysing the definitions provided for dragon in OED, WNT and Web-
ster's Third, the sources of citations span a period from as early as the 12th 
century to the 18th century, and two primary senses are discerned for dragon, 
viz. the obsolete reference to a snake or a serpent and then its meaning as it 
pertains to what is now considered the mythical animal. The following entries 
from OED are illustrative of the lexicographic approach taken in these three 
dictionaries. The issue of the existence of the dragon is seen from a modern 
perspective in as much as it is labelled a mythical animal (cf. sense 2), irrespec-
tive of the fact of the belief in its existence during the Middle Ages (and in 
some sources even as late as the 17th century; cf. Borges 1987: 154):  
(14) dragon ... 1. A huge serpent or snake; a python. Obs. in etymol. use. 
 2. A mythical monster, represented as a huge and terrible reptile, usu-
ally combining ophidian and crocodilian structure, with strong claws, 
like a beast or bird or bird of prey, and a scaly skin; it is generally repre-
sented with wings, and sometimes as breathing out fire. The heraldic 
dragon combines reptilian and mammalian form with the addition of 
wings. 
 It is difficult to separate senses 1 and 2 in early instances. (OED, p. 1012) 
The use of the OM mythical therefore clearly indicates that the issue of the 
existence of the dragon is viewed from the outsider's perspective of the modern 
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world view of basic realism. The fact that the use of dragon in at least some of 
the sources used for citations in the lexicographic articles could have presup-
posed the existence of the animal in the real world, is not accounted for. A cul-
turally biased perspective on the meaning and understanding of the denotation 
of dragon is therefore provided with regard to the historical facts.  
Borges (1987: 154), in reflecting on this modernist perspective on the dragon 
within Western cultures, provides the following insightful comment:  
People believed in the reality of the Dragon. In the middle of the sixteenth cen-
tury, the Dragon is recorded in Conrad Gesner's Historia Animalium, a work of a 
scientific nature. 
 Time has notably worn away the Dragon's prestige. We believe in the lion as 
reality and symbol; we believe in the Minotaur as symbol but no longer as real-
ity. The Dragon is perhaps best known but also the least fortunate of fantastic 
animals. It seems childish to us and usually spoils the stories in which it appears. 
It is worth remembering, however, that we are dealing with a modern prejudice, 
due perhaps to a surfeit of Dragons in fairy tales.  
3.3 Cultural bias and lexical borrowings 
This kind of cultural bias or prejudice is, however, not only a feature of the 
historical treatment of lexical meaning and the related issues of existence and 
truth. It could, and also does show up, for example, in the way dictionaries 
define lexical items borrowed from other languages. The following borrowings 
from Zulu into English and their definitions in the DSAE are illustrative of this 
phenomenon: 
(15) (i)mpundulu (bird) ... The lightning bird ... An evil spirit about which 
there are various beliefs ... It is invoked by witches, and freq. cited before 
judges as the instigator or cause of crime … (DSAE, p. 231) 
(16) tokoloshe ... An evil spirit widely believed in by both urban and rural 
Africans: it is invoked in witchcraft and offered as an extenuating cir-
cumstance in criminal cases … Tokoloshe haunted me says the mad Hillbrow 
killer. I had been attacked by the tokoloshe and I was hopelessly drunk ... The 
first I knew of what I had done was when the police arrested me at my work on 
Monday. Post 18.1.70 (DSAE, p. 372) 
(17) tokoloshe... (in African folklore) a mischievous and lascivious hairy wa-
ter spirit (NODE, p. 1949) 
What is of interest in these definitions is the choice of defining attributes that 
was made from all the relevant beliefs people may have of the impundulu bird 
and the tokoloshe. In both (15) and (16), for example, it is mentioned as defin-
ing attribute that Africans frequently offer these two spirits as explanation, excuse 
or mitigation for some illegal deed before the law. Although merely stated as 
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observed fact, and without any moral comment, it reflects the lexicographer's 
bias as a cultural outsider in as much as it is not linked to or contextualized 
within the religious model of spiritual possession which is part and parcel of a 
number of traditional African religions (cf. Boddy 1997). In such religions, loss 
of personal agency through spiritual possession is seen and experienced as a 
reality. 
This case has an analogue in the efforts of the former South African cricket 
captain, Hansie Cronjé, to attribute his fixing of cricket matches to the work of 
the devil, but both cases illustrate the basic conflict between the common sense 
world views of ordinary people about spiritual possession and agency and the 
world view of the law in which beliefs about spiritual possession and agency 
are linked to psychological instability — the reference to the mad killer in the 
quotation at tokoloshe perhaps being no coincidence.  
In definition (17), however, no reference is made to the fact that spiritual 
possession by the tokoloshe is offered as mitigation for some misdeed, which 
again raises the question of how lexicographers decide on the defining attrib-
utes for their definitions. Such selections for the construction of dictionary 
definitions are in fact dictated by lexicographers' biases or impressions of the 
saliency of beliefs.  
4. Conclusion 
Given the lack of research on how beliefs of existence and truth are encoded in 
dictionaries, this study is only exploratory in nature. The findings do, however, 
permit a few general conclusions.  
An analysis of current descriptive practices in a number of dictionaries in 
Sections 2 and 3 clearly indicates that lexicographers encode the beliefs people 
have about the existence of the entities referred to by lexical items and about 
the truth of the attributes accredited to entities. This is clearly done from a spe-
cific cultural perspective, and more specifically in modern explanatory diction-
aries, from the perspective of reality construed as existing as an independent 
external real or empirical world and people's common sense understanding of 
this world. The latter acts as default reference point with regard to issues of 
existence and truth; all deviances from this point of reference are therefore ex-
plicitly marked with the help of ontological and epistemological/truth mark-
ers. 
The second major point to be made is that one can in principle not con-
struct an explanatory dictionary and do so in an objective way, i.e. without 
adhering to a specific world view. The decision on what the default world view 
should be for any dictionary therefore becomes critical in compiling an explan-
atory dictionary, and this has to be made by a careful analysis of the cultural 
model(s) of the linguistic communities whose language will be the object of 
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description. Such models may or may not coincide with those of the lexicogra-
pher, but obviously those of the linguistic community should have priority. As 
indicated in the case of Der naturen bloeme, homogeneity with regard to the 
dominant world view simplifies the lexicographer's task as deviances become 
unnecessary to mark; heterogeneity, on the other hand, forces one to make an 
explicit choice for a default world view and deviances have to be marked.  
Thirdly, lexicographers should be extremely sensitive to cultural biases in 
defining lexical items. Careful consideration should be taken as to whose 
beliefs are encoded in dictionary definitions, especially also in linguistic com-
munities which are culturally very diverse — speakers of (varieties of) English 
in South Africa, being a prime example.  
The analysis and discussion of the encoding of truth and existence in dic-
tionary definitions started off with a rather minimalist set of assumptions about 
dictionary definitions, lexical meanings as mental constructs, ICMs as broader 
cognitive constructs against which lexical meanings are defined and motivated 
and the links that hold between them. It served this exploratory analysis well, 
but obviously the theoretical framework needs further refinement, especially 
with regard to the kinds of human domains of experience, understanding and 
meaning (or ICMs) taken by default or by deviance to act as justificatory con-
texts and the variety of ways they are encoded in dictionary definitions.  
Furthermore, the way in which dictionaries relativize aspects of existence 
and truth to specific justificatory ICMs, is most probably only a small mani-
festation of a much wider phenomenon in dictionaries that needs to be re-
searched and explicated. As Niiniluoto (1999: 227-228) indicates, relativism 
abounds. Concepts of existence and truth are only one of a host of cognitive 
categories which are relativized to such ICMs: 
 Cognitive categories taken to be relative in some respect 
  Ontological concepts: Objects, facts, world, reality 
  Semantic concepts: Truth, reference, meaning 
  Epistemological concepts : Perception, belief, justification, knowledge 
  Methodological concepts: Inference, rationality, progress 
  Moral categories: Customs, values, ethics, law, politics, religion 
 
 Cognitive categories to which other categories are taken to be relative 
  Persons 
  Groups 
  Cultures 
  Environments 
  Languages 
  Conceptual frameworks 
  Theories 
  Paradigms 
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  Points of view 
  Forms of life 
  Gender 
  Social class 
  Social practices 
  Social interests 
  Values 
Obviously, then, this article has only superficially touched on a much larger 
and complex phenomenon.  
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